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1231 
COMMENTS 
THE SILVER LINING IN THE RED GIANT: CHINA‘S 
RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE LAWS PROMOTE 
TEMPERANCE AMONG THE SURGING MIDDLE CLASS 
“For  China‟s  emerging middle class,  this  is  an  age of aspira-
tion—but also a time of anxiety. Opportunities have multiplied, 
but each one brings pressure to take part and not lose out, and 
every acquisition seems to come ready-wrapped in disappointment 
that it isn‟t something newer and better. An apartment that was 
renovated a few years ago looks dated; a mobile phone without a 
video camera and color screen is an embarrassment. Classes in 
colloquial English are fashionable among Shanghai schoolchild-
ren, but everything costs money.”1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The nascent Chinese middle class bypassed the ―Great Reces-
sion‖2 despite China‘s global infrastructure investments suffering 
dire consequences.3 Wall Street‘s toxic tranches stacked atop one 
another in collateralized debt obligations seemingly comprised 
the most epidemic and obscure entity in financial history. Media 
outlets reported China‘s second largest commercial bank held 
over nine billion dollars in U.S. subprime mortgage-backed secur-
1. Leslie T. Chang, Gilded Age, Gilded Cage: China‟s Sudden Prosperity Brings Un-
dreamed-of Freedoms and New Anxieties, NAT‘L GEOGRAPHIC, May 2008, http://ngm.na 
tionalgeographic.com/2008/05/china/middle-class/leslie-chang-text. 
2. Referring to the recent economic downturn as the ―Great Recession‖ was partially
motivated by a Wall Street Journal article. See David Wessel, A Big, Bad . . .  „Great‟ Re-
cession?, WALL ST. J., Apr. 8, 2010, at A2. 
3. See Chinese Bank Has $9 Billion in Subprime-Backed Securities, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
24, 2007, at C7. 
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ities,4 yet China‘s gross domestic product surged as usual by  8.7% 
in 2009.5 Members of the middle class marched on, renovating the 
apartment and following the latest trends. 
Astronomical growth in unstable times begs the question: what 
corners do the Chinese cut to obtain such extraordinary results? 
U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner frequently chides the 
Chinese Politburo for undervaluing the yuan in an effort to offer 
more beneficial financing to nations importing Chinese products.6 
Secretary Geithner, however, need hark back only five years to 
discover a conclusive finding that China‘s actions failed to reach 
the threshold of currency manipulation.7 While Secretary Geith-
ner‘s argument merits further investigation, the Treasury should 
seek alternative rationales for China‘s extensive growth in the 
last two years. 
How did the Chinese government beat the system? The inter-
national community frequently criticizes China for failure to codi-
fy human rights guarantees,8 blatant disregard of intellectual 
property rights,9 and dangerous poisons in its exports.10 Its go-
vernmental structure, however, guided it through arguably the 
most turbulent financial period in eighty years. 
This comment examines the rise of China‘s middle class and 
proactive governance to protect its economy from a housing bub-
ble during the global downturn. An analysis of recently enacted 
Chinese labor and corporate laws demonstrates how the govern-
ment facilitated the rise of the middle class. The comment dis-
cusses the ramifications of strict domestic residential mortgage 
regulations and how China‘s tempered investment structure se-
4. Id.
5. China‟s GDP Grows 8.7% in 2009, GOV.CN (Jan. 21, 2010), http://www.gov.cn/eng
lish/2010-01/21/content_1516261.htm. 
6. See, e.g., Jackie Calmes, Geithner Hints at Harder Line on China Trade, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 23, 2009, at A1. 
7. U.S. GOV‘T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE GAO-05-351, INTERNATIONAL TRADE:
TREASURY ASSESSMENTS HAVE NOT FOUND CURRENCY MANIPULATION, BUT CONCERNS 
ABOUT EXCHANGE RATES CONTINUE 15 (2005). 
8. See, e.g., Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Rep. on its 75th
Sess., Aug. 3–28, 2009, U.N. DOC. CERD IC/CHINICO 190-13 (Sept. 15, 2009) [hereinafter 
Committee Report]. 
9. See, e.g., Ted C. Fishman, How to Stop Intellectual Property Theft in China, June
1, 2006, at 98. 
10. See, e.g., Rick Weiss, Tainted Chinese Imports Common, WASH. POST, May 20,
2007, at A1. 
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cured its domestic housing market. Part II of this comment ex-
amines China‘s investment and consumption patterns compared 
to domestic growth. Part III discusses how the surging middle 
class grew to seek investment opportunities in the real estate 
market and abroad. Part IV analyzes China‘s efforts to tame 
growing interest in the domestic housing market. Part V assesses 
the shortcomings in U.S. mortgage laws before 2008 and efforts to 
remedy such oversights, and concludes that China‘s anticipatory 
legislating and restrictive investment structure shielded it from 
depression. 
II. CROSSING THE RIVER BY FEELING THE STONES: EXPANSION,
INVESTMENT, AND CONSUMPTION THE RIGHT WAY 
The concept of crossing the river by feeling the stones summa-
rizes China‘s growth initiative. The notion implies a country‘s 
rapid pursuit of a variety of investments, while simultaneously 
isolating itself in unstable markets and only emerging when it 
feels certain one minor miscue will not result in demise.11 These 
isolationist policies often create strife between China and its eco-
nomic and diplomatic partners;12 however, such initiatives have 
immunized China from suffering alongside those partners. 
China‘s reluctance to expand its housing market,13 permit for-
eign investment in its infrastructure,14 and create investment 
programs for its citizens to invest in overseas initiatives seeming-
ly paid dividends.15 Review of the Chinese financial firms‘ balance 
sheets likely would yield nothing pertaining to subprime mort-
gages, collateralized debt obligations, and mortgage-backed secur-
ities, outside the substantial investments made in Wall Street 
firms. Still hesitant to open its real estate investment doors to 
outsiders after the subprime mortgage crisis, China understand-
11. See Wang Ming, Chinese Investing Overseas Gets Easier, WALL ST. J., Jan. 11,
2011, at A9; Satya J. Gabriel, Economic Liberalization in Post-Mao China: Crossing the 
River by Feeling for Stones, SATYA GABRIEL‘S ONLINE PAPERS: CHINA ESSAY SERIES (Oct. 
1998), http://www.mtholyoke.edu/courses/sgabriel/economics/china-essays/7.html. 
12. See, e.g., Thom Shanker, Rumsfeld Warns Young Chinese on Isolationism, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 19, 2005, at A8. 
13. See, e.g., Gregory M. Stein, Mortgage Law in China: Comparing Theory and Prac-
tice, 72 MO. L. REV. 1315, 1345 (2007). 
14. See Steven M. Dickinson & Daniel P. Harris, Dickinson and Harris on Foreign In-
vestment in China, 2008 EMERGING ISSUES 1197 (Nov. 29, 2007 (LEXIS)). 
15. See Keith Bradsher, China Relaxes a Barrier, Letting Citizens Invest in the Hong
Kong Stock Market, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2007, at C4. 
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ably has idiosyncratic mortgage policies excluding low income 
earners.16 
Residential mortgage law in China ostensibly assumes three 
tiers: fervent protection from the lower class, gradual pacification 
of the wealthy, and establishment of a niche for the rapidly grow-
ing middle class.17 Rampant economic, technological, and popula-
tion growth requires a forward-thinking government to conform 
laws to technological innovation and an inversely vigilant gov-
ernment to recognize the hardships of its growing middle and 
lower classes. China‘s labor, real estate, and foreign investment 
measures in the previous four years promoted housing expansion 
and domestic consumption in a manner protecting the country 
from financial turmoil. By cautiously moving forward and not 
bending to populist sentiment, China brought about unparalleled 
economic success. 
A. Promoting Individual Growth from Lower to Middle Class 
Citizenry with Revolutionary Labor Laws 
The Chinese economy begins and ends with the laborer. Mil-
lions of migrant workers travel to urban centers each season in 
search of temporary work.18 The economic downturn cost laborers 
several million job opportunities, and contract rights under obso-
lete and draconian Chinese labor laws failed to protect them.19 
Difficulties in guaranteeing workers‘ rights still arise despite up-
dated labor laws; however, the measures now provide practical 
remedies for employees.20 
Merely enacting groundbreaking legislation does not automati-
cally elevate a nation rife with labor atrocities to a human rights 
champion.21 The Politburo, however, promulgated an employee 
16. See Stein, supra note 13, at 1340 & n.63.
17. See id.; Chang, supra note 1; Ming, supra note 11.
18. China‟s Economy: A Great Migration into the Unknown, ECONOMIST, Jan. 31,
2009, at 32. 
19. See id.
20. See, e.g., Labor Contract Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat‘l People‘s
Cong., June 29, 2007, effective Jan. 1, 2008), art. 14 (China) http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/ 
FDI_EN/Laws/GeneralLawsandRegulations/BasicLaws/P020070831601380007924.pdf 
(last visited Apr. 15, 2011) [hereinafter PRC Labor Contract Law]. 
21. See, e.g., Christine M. Bulger, Fighting Gender Discrimination in the Chinese
Workplace, 20 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 345, 346–48 (2000). 
2011] CHINA‘S RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE LAWS 1235 
friendly labor and employment law in 2008.22 The measure con-
tains several provisions which may propel low wage factory work-
ers to economic self-reliance and enhanced socioeconomic status. 
The first phase of the law brings China into conformity with the 
West in three ways: (1) it applies to all employers, (2) it requires 
written labor contracts, and (3) it imposes significant penalties on 
employers for failure to comply.23 The second phase resoundingly 
demonstrates China‘s intention to ensure employees receive ade-
quate treatment: employees can claim double salary for months 
worked without a contract for up to twelve months salary.24 This 
rule is ―absolutely going to be applied to ‗informal‘ employment 
relationships common to so many . . . businesses doing business 
in China.‖25 
The legislation also substantially mitigates the detrimental 
impact of term contracts and probationary periods, which were 
―previously popular ways to skirt China‘s existing labor law re-
gime.‖26 The new law eschews the tradition of employing workers 
under various short-term contracts to circumvent for cause ter-
mination, limiting the number of term contracts into which the 
employer may enter with the employee to two.27 Under the subse-
quent open-term contract, ―the [competent] employee is employed 
until he or she chooses to terminate the contract or reaches re-
tirement age. The employer can only terminate the employment 
contract by discharge of the employee for breach.‖28 This provision 
will specifically benefit the migrant worker. The employer retains 
the right to enter into two term contracts; as such, the migrant 
worker may not see the benefits of the legislation until the third 
season in which he returns to the city.29 
The measure implies that once the employee enters into a third 
contract, he will enjoy indefinite employment, subject only to 
22. See generally PRC Labor Contract Law, supra note 20.
23. See id. at art. 2, 10.
24. See id. at art. 82.
25. Steven M. Dickinson & Daniel P. Harris, Dickinson and Harris on China‟s New
Labor Law, 2008 EMERGING ISSUES 1369 (Dec. 6, 2007 (LEXIS)). 
26. Id.
27. See PRC Labor Contract Law, supra note 20, at art. 14; Dickinson & Harris, supra
note 25. 
28. See Dickinson & Harris, supra note 25.
29. See PRC Labor Contract Law, supra note 20, at art. 14; Jovita T. Wang, Article 14
of China‟s New Labor Contract Law: Using Open-Term Contracts to Appropriately Balance 
Worker Protection and Employer Flexibility, 18 PAC. RIM L. & POL‘Y J. 433, 441–42 (2009). 
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termination for incompetence and other codified reasons.30 Guar-
anteed income ostensibly reduces apprehension and fosters wil-
lingness to invest, thereby increasing domestic consumption. Ini-
tial reports indicate that the measure tightens the labor market 
and actually increases wages and minimizes turnover rates.31 
The employment contract jeopardizes employers‘ most prized 
asset: income. Threats to solvency likely will increase compliance. 
Enterprises failing to implement the legislation face administra-
tive fines, awards of double wages, and liability for actual damag-
es.32 Employees, furthermore, may almost always successfully 
sue: 
[V]irtually every violation of the law gives the employee the right to 
sue the employer for penalties and damages in the local employment 
arbitration bureau or in the local courts. . . . [T]he private right of ac-
tion on this [law] all but guarantees plenty of enforcement through 
litigation. The new law has been actively publicized, and employees 
are well informed about their rights under the new law. . . . This is a 
change from the past when employees were not allowed to file claims 
against companies.33 
Employers face substantial ramifications for straying from 
these innovative provisions, and employees stand to reap what 
previously would have been considered a financial windfall upon 
unlawful derogation from this labor contract law. 
The difficulty remains in the practical application of antibusi-
ness legislation in a nation driven primarily by commerce and 
lacking firmly rooted rule of law principles. In early 2009, the 
CLSA China Purchasing Managers Index reported that China‘s 
manufacturing sector contracted for the fifth consecutive month 
in December.34 Coupled with such difficulties, ―[p]ressures from 
the labor law may encourage factories to close [during the down-
turn] rather than pay what they owe to workers under the law.‖35 
30. See PRC Labor Contract Law, supra note 20, at art. 39; Wang, supra note 29, at
443. 
31. Jonathan Adams, Chinese Union: New Labor Regulations Designed to Protect Chi-
na‟s Workers Are Already Having an Impact, According to an American-Based Watchdog, 
NEWSWEEK, Feb. 14, 2008, http://www.newsweek.com/2008/02/13/chinese-union.html. 
32. See PRC Labor Contract Law, supra note 20, at arts. 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85; Dickin-
son & Harris, supra note 25. 
33. See Dickinson & Harris, supra note 25.
34. Sky Canaves, Factory Closures Strain China‟s Labor Law, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17,
2009, at A6. 
35. Id.
2011] CHINA‘S RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE LAWS 1237 
If the expected revaluation of the yuan lessens formal appeal of 
Chinese exports, ―then local officials and mainland companies 
may collude to ignore laws and ensure that labor costs stay low.‖36 
Mainland companies face sharply increasing mediation and arbi-
tration requests from hundreds of thousands of employees, and 
those who engage in the process ―encounter severe obstacles.‖37 
Conversely, and perhaps most importantly, workers now have 
specific forums of remedy to seek redress for grievances. Only 
time will tell whether the judiciary remains independent enough 
to enforce the legislation and whether employers will accept the 
fines rather than seek legal advice, but these laws will become 
particularly crucial as the lower class ascends to more affluent 
socioeconomic status and pursues investment opportunities, par-
ticularly overseas. 
B. Patience is a Virtue in a Global Market 
England‘s transfer of sovereignty of Hong Kong to China in 
1997 corresponded with the rapid ascendancy of a relatively weal-
thy Chinese middle class.38 When China reclaimed dominion over 
its economically prosperous territory, it did so under the condition 
that Hong Kong and China operate under the ―One County, Two 
Systems‖ style of governance.39 Hong Kong would remain Asia‘s 
financial hub,40 while accepting military patronage and foreign 
diplomacy oversight from the mainland.41 The new sovereign thus 
waited patiently, neglecting any attempt to capitalize on Hong 
36. Edward Wong, As China Aids Labor, Unrest Is Still Rising, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 
2010, at A1. 
37. Stanley Lubman, Chinese Workers‟ Rising Rights—Consciousness, WALL ST. J.
BLOG (Oct. 20, 2010, 7:11 PM, http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2010/10/20/chinese-work 
ers-rising-rights-consciousness/. 
38. Tai-lok Lui, How a Fragmented Business-Government Alliance Has Helped
Change Hong Kong‟s Political Order, H.K.J., SUMMER 2008, http://www.hkjournal.org/ 
PDF/2008_summer/5.pdf. 
39. See Background Note: Hong Kong, U.S. DEP‘T OF STATE (Aug. 3, 2010), http://www.
state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2747.htm; see also One Country; Two Systems, CHINA.ORG.CN, http:// 
www.china.org.cn/english/feaures/china/203730.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2011) (discuss-
ing the ―one country, two systems‖ form of government). 
40. See Background Note, Hong Kong, supra note 39.
41. See XIANGGANG JIBEN FA art. 13, 14 (H.K.), available at http://www.basiclaw.gov.
hk/en/basiclawtext/chapter_2.html; Background Note: Hong Kong, supra note 39. 
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Kong‘s recently exploded property bubble that so many ex-
ploited.42 
In 2007, a few months before ―subprime‖ became a dirty word, 
China‘s National Development and Reform Commission issued a 
revised Catalog for the Guidance of Foreign Invested Enterprises, 
which ―provide[d] the basic guidance for foreign investment with-
in China.‖43 It divided investments into ―encouraged,‖ ―restricted,‖ 
and ―prohibited‖ categories.44 ―The new policy discourages or pro-
hibits foreign investment in businesses solely devoted to export (a 
180 degree reversal of prior policy).‖45 The 2007 amendments also 
prohibit investment in home development and real estate opera-
tions.46 The amendments to restrict investment in home develop-
ment and real estate operations exemplify Chinese foresight, 
substantiating the Trade and Economic Cooperation Bureau deci-
sion to prohibit individuals from investing in overseas housing 
markets and foreign investors from plaguing China‘s develop-
ment industry. 
Four years later, flush with over one trillion dollars of Ameri-
can debt47 and incurring an onslaught of international provoca-
tion about its lack of stimulus policies,48 China finally opened its 
individual citizens‘ doors to the international market.49 The Chi-
nese government initiated its first step toward facilitating indi-
vidual foreign investment when it permitted individuals in the 
city of Wenzhou to invest directly overseas.50 The government 
sought to reduce controls on its currency,51 whereby it could pla-
42. See, e.g., Alex Frew McMillan, A Village Getaway from Busy Hong Kong, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 15, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/16/greathomesanddestinations/16 
iht-revillage.html. 
43. Dickinson & Harris, supra note 25; Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign Invest-
ment Industries, CHINADAILY.COM.CN (Apr. 20, 2006, 9:30 AM), http://www.chinadaily. 
com.cn/bizchina/2006-04/20/content_572219.htm (translating the Catalogue for the Guid-
ance of Foreign Investment Industries). 
44. Dickinson & Harris, supra note 25.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See Major Foreign Holders of Treasury Securities, U.S. DEP‘T OF THE TREASURY
(Feb. 28, 2011), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/tic/documents/ 
mfh.txt. 
48. See, e.g., U.S. DEP‘T OF THE TREASURY, OFFICE OF INT‘L AFFAIRS, REPORT TO 
CONGRESS ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND EXCHANGE RATE POLICIES 12–16 (2011). 
49. See Ming, supra note 11.
50. See id.
51. See id.
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cate international concern over currency manipulation and ana-
lyze the success and failure rates of its citizens‘ investments. The 
Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation Bureau, the Politburo‘s 
guardian of the experiment, determined that no single project 
could receive more than three million dollars annually from the 
community, and that the community as a whole may invest no 
more than $200 million annually.52 The Chinese are gradually 
starting to venture into the field of individual foreign investment, 
but this should not dissuade capitalist systems from closely ob-
serving the investors‘ pursuits and success rates. 
Beijing‘s decision to place its currency in flux throughout Hong 
Kong and U.S. markets (Hong Kong and China have different 
currencies) indicates a second initiative: to acquiesce to investors. 
China ―launched trading in its currency in the [United States] for 
the first time [in January 2011], an explicit endorsement by Bei-
jing of the fast-growing market in the yuan and a significant step 
in the country‘s plan to foster global trading in its currency.‖53 
Daily trading is currently at $400 million (in yuan).54 Trading 
currency in the United States should increase the value of the 
yuan, and it likely is no coincidence that China considered open-
ing its individual investors to foreign markets at the same time. 
Permitting gradual ascendance up the investment ladder and 
timid introduction of the yuan into foreign markets seems both 
prudent and calculating. China understands the risks associated 
with permitting unbridled investment in farcical entities and em-
ployed an intelligent, albeit spartan, method by which to monitor 
individual investment. Cautiously facilitating the introduction of 
private investors into foreign markets allows the Chinese to si-
multaneously appease international concerns over intentional 
currency devaluation while scrutinizing the markets in which its 
citizens invest. 
Revaluation of the yuan ―will simply result in a shift of manu-
facturing among emerging markets, leaving the [United States] 
with a somewhat smaller trade deficit, higher prices for imported 
goods and higher interest rates, but not necessarily higher levels 
52. See id.
53. Lingling Wei, China Shows Its Growing Might—New Move to Make Yuan a Global
Currency, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 2011, at A1. 
54. See id.
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of employment.‖55 If interest rates increase, further outcry from 
the G-20 may arise in a continued effort to replace the dollar as 
the global standard. The twenty regional economic hegemons 
―supported a general allocation of the [International Monetary 
Fund‘s Special Drawing Rights equivalent to $250 billion to boost 
global liquidity [and] urged urgent ratification of the Fourth 
Amendment to the International Monetary Fund Charter, first 
proposed in 1997, which seeks to make the allocation of SDRs 
more equitable.‖56 The organization took the first step toward 
slighting the dollar; the yuan, consequently, may demonstrate its 
strength on the world stage while the dollar falls. This process 
began with the advent of a Chinese middle class, however, before 
the world endured the ramifications of granting adjustable-rate 
mortgages to subprime borrowers. 
III. THE REAL ESTATE MARKET AND THE MIDDLE CLASS:
100 MILLION HOMES FOR EVERYONE? 
The emerging middle class stormed into the new decade 100 
million members strong,57 saddled with the notion that their life 
station entitles them to home ownership.58 An amalgamation of 
revisions in land ownership laws, foreign investment policy, and 
mortgage regulations that created the middle class now drives up 
property values in urban centers across China. But China has 
subsequently tempered the housing market in a timely fashion. 
Savings accounts of Chinese individuals are plummeting,59 and 
personal housing mortgages, while not spiraling, indicate that the 
55. Zhiwu Chen, Renminbi Revaluation Won‟t Trigger a Shopping Spree, YALEGLOBAL 
ONLINE MAG. (May 12, 2010), http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/renminbi-revaluation-
wont-trigger-shopping-spree. 
56. IMF Resources and the G-20 Summit, INT‘L MONETARY FUND (Feb. 11, 2010),
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/faq/sdrfaqs.htm. 
57. See CTR. FOR INFO. POLICY LEADERSHIP, HUNTON & WILLIAMS LLP, CHINA 
PRIVACY GOVERNANCE (2007), http://www.hunton.com/files/tbl_s47Details%5CFileUpload 
265%5C 1944%5CChina_Privacy_Two-Pager.pdf. 
58. See Josef Jelinek, British Chamber Eye Interviews with Tom Docteroff, CEO of
JWT Greater China, CHAMBER EYE: MAG. OF THE BRIT. CHAMBER OF COM. GUANGDANG, 
Spring/Summer 2010, at 17, 18, available at http://www.britchamgd.com/userfiles/file/ 
Chamber%20Summer%202010-Leisure%20&%20Entertainment(WEB).pdf. 
59. See Chapter 2: China Towards 2020: Growth Performance and Sustainability,
ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., http://www.oecd.org/document/45/0, 
3746,en_33873108_39418537_45666733_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2011) (sur-
veying Chinese domestic savings accounts from 1994–2007). 
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government must rein in excessive loans.60 The Chinese find 
themselves comfortably situated, however, because of their his-
torical tendency to gradually cede control back to the market af-
ter heavy regulation.61 China‘s standard corporate structure, as 
discussed below, helped guide low income earners to new socioe-
conomic levels, and its unique mortgage and land laws motivated 
investment in infrastructure while limiting exposure to dire fi-
nancial risk. 
A.  History of Incorporating in China and the Emergence of 
Medium and Small-Scale (“M&S”) Enterprises 
Foreign investment legislation ―did not exist until China made 
a policy shift to open its markets in the late 1970s. . . . The legis-
lation thus has turned from a system of ‗two standards for domes-
tic and foreign investment‘ to a single-standard system.‖62 This 
single standard system fostered foreign corporate growth within 
China.63 The two basic types of corporations in China are the li-
mited liability corporation (―LLC‖) and the joint stock limited 
company (―JSC‖).64 
The National People‘s Congress (―NPC‖), one of three branches 
of the Chinese government, passed the M&S Enterprises Promo-
tion Law to ―regulate[ ] financial and business support, technolo-
gical innovation, market expansion, social services, and other im-
60. See generally Report: China‟s Banks Suspend Property Loans, CHINA BRIEFING
(Nov. 15, 2010), http://www.china-briefing.com/news/2010/11/15/chinas-banks-suspend-pro 
perty-loans.html. 
61. Compare General Principles of the Civil Law (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat‘l People‘s Cong., Apr. 12, 1986, effective Jan. 1, 1987), art. 73 (China), http:// 
www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI_EN/Laws/GeneralLawsandRegulations/BasicLaws/P02006062032
0966257030.pdf [hereinafter Civil Law] (stating that ―[s]tate property shall be owned by 
the whole people‖ and that ―[s]tate property is sacred and inviolable‖), with Law on the 
Administration of Urban Real Estate (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat‘l People‘s 
Cong., July 5, 1994, effective Jan. 1, 1995), art. 7 (China) http://www.npc.gov.cn/english 
npc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383755.htm [hereinafter Law of Urban Real Estate] (grant-
ing individuals the right to use state-owned land). 
62. 2 GAO LINGYUN & JIA XILING, SERIES ON CONTEMPORARY CHINESE LAW: CHINESE 
BUSINESS LAW 17 (Charles Wellford ed., 2008). 
63. See, e.g., Pascal Lamy, Dir.-Gen., World Trade Org., Message to the Fourth Beijing
International Forum on WTO and China (2005) and the Sixth Beijing Chaoyang Interna-
tional Business Festival (Sept. 15, 2005), available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/ 
sppl_e/sppl01_e.htm. 
64. See Companies Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat‘l People‘s Cong.,
Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006), art. 2 (China), http://www.npc.gov/en/englishpc/law/ 
2007-12/13/content_1384124.htm [hereinafter Companies Law]. 
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portant aspects of the development of the M&S enterprises.‖65 The 
NPC effectively mandated that the federal government must, 
with minimal restriction, cultivate market expansion through fi-
nancial support.66 This policy cogently demonstrates (1) why Chi-
na infuriates countries by breaching trade and subsidy agree-
ments, and (2) how the middle class emerged from the Great 
Recession largely unscathed. 
B. China‟s Violations of Subsidy and Trade Agreements 
China, unlike the United States, is not a party to the Organisa-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development (―OECD‖).67 The 
OECD requires its members to consult with it on substantial ex-
port deals to ensure governments are not unfairly subsidizing 
private ventures, thus skewing ―a level playing field.‖68 China 
may subsidize its operations without repercussion because it is 
not an OECD member, and it is ―winning deals in part because [it 
is] not playing by the rules.‖69 China‘s bids for export contracts, in 
short, likely succeed because the NPC subsidizes its own market 
or offers unmatchable funding options to developing third-world 
countries needing its exports. Chinese companies upon which the 
government relies for consistent revenue streams, therefore, suf-
fered substantially less than the United States, Japan, and the 
European Union during the height of the recession,70 permitting 
employment levels to stagnate or decline.71 
OECD parties have sought creative methods by which to coun-
ter Chinese initiatives. The United States Export-Import Bank, 
for example, responded in kind by matching China‘s cheaper pric-
es for the first time ever on a locomotive deal with Pakistan, and 
65. LINGYUN & XILING, supra note 62, at 16.
66. See id. at 16–17.
67. Members and Partners, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., http://www.
oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_36734052_36761800_1_1_1_1_1,000.html (last visited Apr. 15, 
2011). 
68. See, e.g., Sudeep Reddy, U.S. Export Financing Challenges China, WALL ST. J., 
Jan. 12, 2010, at A11. 
69. Id.
70. Press Release, World Trade Org., Trade to Expand by 9.5% in 2010 After a Dismal
2009, WTO Reports 5 (Mar. 26, 2010), available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres 
10_e/pr598_e.htm. 
71. See, e.g., China‟s Unemployment Rate Falls to 4.1% in Sept, CHINA DAILY (Oct. 22,
2010), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-10/22/content_11445691.htm. 
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received OECD approval.72 Intergovernmental organizations now 
recognize the necessity of interpreting their rule structures le-
niently when nonmembers gain economic advantages over mem-
bers merely because of a state‘s membership in the organization. 
C. Too Small to Fail: How Small Business Subsidies Promote a 
Growing Middle Class 
Establishing M&S enterprises requires that capital contribu-
tions from incorporators must meet statutory minimums,73 a risky 
first step for individuals lacking substantial disposable liquidity. 
The State Council, however, rewards the risk by providing a 
structural safety net through 
regulating M&S enterprises and formulating a thorough develop-
ment plan. To create a development fund, the M&S Enterprises 
Promotion Law requires the central government to establish a sepa-
rate budget item for M&S enterprises. The law also provides that the 
government consider first procuring goods and services from M&S 
enterprises in formulating its central plan. Other measures include 
local government‘s financial support and a credit guarantee system. 
State policy also encourages M&S enterprises to utilize foreign capi-
tal, as well as advanced technology and management experiences 
from foreign countries by establishing foreign-Chinese equity or con-
tractual joint ventures. Qualified M&S enterprises also are encour-
aged to invest abroad and participate in international trade.74 
The logical conclusion to derive from codification of such bene-
fits is that the Chinese government refuses to permit small and 
medium-sized businesses to fail. This special treatment inocu-
lates them from downturns. The law seems to provide a regi-
mented process through which M&S enterprises may succeed, or 
through which the government may make the enterprises suc-
ceed.75 Data does not exist articulating the number of employees 
currently working for M&S enterprises, but the Politburo deemed 
it substantial enough to merit extremely invasive regulation. This 
72. Reddy, supra note 68.
73. Companies Law, supra note 64, at arts. 23, 77 (requiring the statutory minimum
amount of capital for the incorporation of a ―company with limited liability‖ and a ―compa-
ny limited by shares‖). 
74. LINGYUN & XILING, supra note 62, at 17; see Law on Promotion of Small and Me-
dium-Sized Enterprises (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat‘l People‘s Cong., June 
29, 2002, effective Jan. 1, 2003), arts. 4, 10–13, 17, 27, 34, 36 (China), http://www.gov.cn/ 
english/laws/2005-10/08/content_75040.htm [hereinafter Law on M&S Enterprises]. 
75. See Law on M&S Enterprises, supra note 74; LINGYUN & XILING, supra note 62.
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example of unadulterated government intervention in the private 
sector demonstrates another reason why the middle class has 
rarely foundered, comparatively, from 2008 until the present. 
Protection of small business and egregious subsidization of ex-
ports are two factors that created the mass-personal financial 
growth spawning the middle class. As the middle class grew in 
wealth and number, a reasonable assumption would be that an 
increase in domestic consumption and home purchasing followed. 
However, ―Chinese consumption as a percentage of [gross domes-
tic product] has actually declined in the past decade, from 46 per-
cent in 2000 to 36 percent in 2009.‖76 China can sustain rapid 
growth ―only by increasing investment well beyond what is eco-
nomically useful‖ to the country, ―unless domestic consumption 
expands dramatically.‖77 Some reports rank China ―as one of the 
world‘s biggest savers, at a national rate of 38 percent of [gross 
domestic product].‖78 Recently, new studies revealed that savings 
accounts among Chinese households plummeted by approximate-
ly 30 percent between 1994 and 2007.79 The issue becomes locat-
ing the money if a middle class citizen with discretionary spend-
ing ability saves 38 percent of his gross domestic product,80 
domestic consumption falls by 10 percent throughout a decade,81 
and individual overseas investment only recently became availa-
ble.82 One answer is the housing market. 
D. A History of Land Ownership and Personal Residential 
Mortgages in China 
The principles of Communism dictate that the land belongs to 
the people.83 A 1988 amendment to the Chinese Constitution 
reads, however, ―The right to the use of land may be transferred 
76. Owen Matthews & Alexandra A. Seno, How Asia‟s Binge Shoppers Will Help the




79. See Chapter 2: China Towards 2020: Growth Performance and Sustainability, su-
pra note 59. 
80. See Matthews & Seno, supra note 76.
81. See id.
82. See Ming, supra note 11.
83. Civil Law, supra note 61, at art. 73 (stating that ―[s]tate property shall be owned
by the whole people‖ and that ―[s]tate property is sacred and inviolable‖). 
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in accordance with the law.‖84 This provision does not allow pri-
vate land ownership85 but does allow the government to grant 
land use rights for a specified term.86 Such a structure permits 
the government to requisition lands without providing fair mar-
ket value for the property. China contemporarily enforces this 
land provision by 
―plugging‖ local markets into a large scale financial infrastructure of 
investment resources from outside the country and integrating it 
with locally emerging networks. Network access, strategic use of 
leasing mechanisms, and the willingness to deal in property-like as-
sets proved sufficient for real estate development without a need for 
an official legal classification of ―property.‖ We can understand this 
idea of property-like assets when we think of important assets that 
are valued and exchanged in the United States even if they are not 
necessarily classified as property per se. Examples of such property-
like assets include trademarks, goodwill, licenses, contract rights, 
and rights in lawsuits.87 
The timing of the 1988 amendment ironically corresponds with 
the introduction of the first residential mortgage loan programs 
offered in China.88 
―The first residential mortgage loan in China was issued by the 
China Construction Bank (CCB) in 1986.‖89 In 1997, the ―total 
outstanding mortgage balance in China was only around . . . 22 
billion [yuan].‖90 ―[T]he outstanding balance of residential mort-
gages reached 1.7 trillion [yuan], approximately . . . 207 billion 
[U.S. dollars]‖ in 2005.91 ―The current residential mortgage mar-
ket in China is dominated by four major lenders—[the] Industrial 
and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), [the] China Construction 
Bank (CCB), [the] Bank of China, and [the] Agricultural Bank of 
China.‖92 ―They account for more than 90 [percent] of the total 
84. XIANFA art. 10 (2004) (China).
85. Ming, supra note 11.
86. Law of Urban Real Estate, supra note 61, at art. 7.
87. Robin Paul Malloy, Real Estate Transactions and Entrepreneurship: Transforming
Value Through Exchange, 43 IND. L. REV. 1105, 1110–11 (2010). 
88. See Yongheng Deng et al., An Early Assessment of Residential Mortgage Perfor-
mance in China, 31 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 117, 117 (2005). 
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Yongheng Deng & Peng Liu, Mortgage Prepayment and Default Behavior with
Embedded Forward Contract Risks in China‟s Housing Market, 38 J. REAL EST. FIN. & 
ECON. 214, 214–15 (2009) (citation omitted). 
92. Deng et al., supra note 88, at 119.
1246 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1231 
outstanding mortgage balance,‖93 and all banks follow the same 
lending rules so as to avoid confusion among lenders and borrow-
ers.94 All loans are adjustable-rate mortgages,95 which means that 
the interest rates may be changed periodically throughout the 
term of the loan.96 
Depository institutions‘ role in issuing the majority of adjusta-
ble-rate mortgages differs from our regime, where government-
sponsored entities such as Fannie Mae play a substantial role in 
the U.S. mortgage market.97 Domestic safeguards shielded China 
from the same tailspin as the United States. For example, ―[t]he 
loan amount [of a mortgage may] not exceed 80 percent of the ap-
praisal value or the purchase price of the house, whichever is 
smaller, and payment to income ratio should not exceed 70 [per-
cent].‖98 These provisions effectually require the borrower to ei-
ther make a 20 percent down payment on the loan or pay 20 per-
cent on the purchase price of the real estate up front, establishing 
a firm equity base. 
China manifests its guiding principles for personal residential 
mortgages in a rule that requires lower income borrowers to pre-
pay a substantial portion of the loan as a down payment, as 
―loans that are eventually prepaid have higher equity to market 
value ratio than the rest of the loans in the pool.‖99 This practice 
―suggest[s] that borrowers with less liquidity constrain [sic] in 
China are likely to payoff [sic] their mortgage earlier.‖100 Empiri-
cal analysis suggests, however, that .03% of low-income mortgage 
recipients defaulted on loan repayments between 1999 and 
2002.101 This practice alone may reveal the most pivotal difference 
between U.S. and Chinese mortgage policies that could have 
spared the United States from recession. 
93. Deng & Liu, supra note 91, at 217.
94. Id.
95. Deng, Zheng & Ling, supra note 88, at 122.
96. See FED. RES. BD., CONSUMER HANDBOOK ON ADJUSTABLE RATE MORTGAGES 1
(2009), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/arms/armsbrochure.pdf. 
97. See About Us, FANNIE MAE, http://www.fanniemae.com/kb/index?page=home&c=
aboutus (last visited Apr. 15, 2011). 
98. Deng, Zheng & Ling, supra note 88, at 119.
99. Id. at 125.
100. Id. 
101. Id. at 126. 
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Default risk in residential mortgage lending in China, while 
more likely if not prepaid, is ―quite low.‖102 ―For all groups, the de-
fault risk is less than one percent.‖103 Approximately ―69 percent 
of borrowers are from . . . high income households.‖104 ―[M]edian 
income households are the most reluctant to prepay.‖105 The mid-
dle class thus finds itself bolstered by the wealthy, who possess 
the requisite capital to repay the loans, and the lower class, from 
which Chinese banks also require a down payment on a substan-
tial portion of the loan.106 Providing loans primarily to the wealthy 
yields the intended result of an adjustable-rate mortgage: procure 
more income by elevating rates as the market fluctuates. Delin-
quency results in higher interest percentages, which the wealthy 
can afford. Banks simply neglect to consider low income earners 
when gauging a potential rate increase because they already have 
a substantial down payment.107 
Lastly, the culture simply refuses to borrow. ―According to a 
survey reported by Beijing City Survey Organization, more than 
75 percent of Beijing residents are aware of the availability of 
personal loans, but less than 10 percent of them have ever ap-
plied for loans.‖108 Rigorous procedures govern the process by 
which banks provide personal residential mortgages, and specific 
emphasis on upfront down payments has drastically mitigated 
default among subprime borrowers. 
E. The SAFE Act: Perhaps Too Little, Certainly Too Late109 
The origin of the housing crisis in the United States began not 
simply with overzealous homeowners who quickly found them-
selves underwater, but also with the loan originator. Banks suf-
fered publicity nightmares for investing in packaged subprime 




106. Stein, supra note 13, at 1339–40. 
107. Id. 
108. Deng et al., supra note 88, at 120. 
109. Mr. Kyle Fondren, Business Development Manager and Registered Mortgage Ori-
ginator at CapCenter, deserves special praise and recognition for his invaluable contribu-
tions to the domestic analysis section of this article. Mr. Fondren‘s expertise and diligent 
stewardship of this complex industry should serve as a beacon to policymakers and fellow 
originators alike. 
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loans,110 but the loan originator also bears liability. A loan origi-
nator, as statutorily defined, ―offers or negotiates terms of a resi-
dential mortgage loan for compensation or gain.‖111 Home pur-
chasers who relied on the advice of an underqualified and 
financially motivated loan originator quickly found themselves 
facing monthly financial hardships and negative equity. The ―rate 
of default was highest when the mortgages were sold by [a] loan 
originator [or mortgage broker] to financial firms unaffiliated 
with the loan originator.‖112 Loan originators sold the home pur-
chasers on ―creative‖ mortgage options to help them buy the 
―American Dream,‖ then turned around and sold the mortgage, as 
well as the risk, to financial institutions. Analysts agree that ―se-
curitization adversely affects the incentives of lenders to screen 
their borrowers. . . . It simply reflects the classic moral hazard 
problem that arises once loan originators do not bear the cost of 
default by their borrowers.‖113 Loan originators, consequently, 
could contract with subprime candidates at minimal risk. 
Until 2008, no uniform federal law standardized threshold 
competency requirements for loan originators. The Secure and 
Fair Enforcement for Mortgage Licensing Act of 2008 (―SAFE 
Act‖), one of the seminal laws enacted at the height of the down-
turn, provides safeguards to ensure intelligent and equitable 
lending practices and simplify complex mortgage agreements. 
The SAFE Act establishes several benchmarks for anyone is-
suing a residential mortgage, including licensure requirements 
mandating that ―an applicant has never had a loan originator li-
cense revoked in any governmental jurisdiction‖114 and has not 
been convicted of a crime involving fraud, dishonesty, a breach of 
trust, or money laundering.115 Further protection mandates that 
every applicant pass a written test116 with numerous specifica-
tions that solidify a foundational knowledge of safe lending prac-
 110. See, e.g., David Evans & Jody Shenn, AIG Subprime Debt May Cost $2.3 Billion, 
Analysts Say, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 1, 2007, 5:44 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news? 
pidnewsarchive&sid=aGuw9h.w2Ksc&refer=home. 
111. 12 U.S.C. § 5102(3)(A)(i)(I)–(II) (Supp. III 2009). 
 112. John C. Coffee, Jr. & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasury 
Have a Better Idea?, 95 VA. L. REV. 707, 732 (2009). 
113. Id. at 733. 
114. § 5104(b)(1). 
115. Id. § 5104(b)(2)(B). 
116. Id. § 5104(b)(5). 
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tices.117 The statute also obliges state-licensed loan originators to 
complete annual continuing education requirements in federal 
law and regulations, ethics, and lending standards.118 
Comparatively, China limited its exposure to mortgage vulne-
rability by effectively excluding subprime candidates without suf-
ficient capital to provide substantial down payments. Prior to the 
2008 enactment of the SAFE Act, inconsistent state laws deter-
mined the standards by which loan originators could guarantee 
loans on personal residences,119 and one state even neglected to 
enact such provisions.120 The SAFE Act established the first man-
datory national standard by which loan originators must gain ac-
creditation. In principle, the SAFE Act pursues the same funda-
mental objective as China‘s residential mortgage laws: prevent 
inevitable default. Congress simply reacted, while the NPC un-
derstood the complexity of the industry and initiated the restric-
tion. 
IV. EFFORTS TO TAME THE FRENZY
Beijing justifiably finds itself increasingly concerned with the 
housing market despite various measures in place to prevent a 
growing bubble.121 Housing reflects status, and the middle class 
frequently craves tangible recognition of their newly acquired 
wealth.122 ―[T]he residential real estate market has not been able 
to keep up with the demand for units in which to invest. This 
scarcity of desirable vacant land has contributed to the sharp 
spike in prices for urban residential units.‖123 Those enthused by 
117. Id. § 5104(d)(1)–(3). 
118. Id. § 5105(b)(1). 
119. See generally FED. RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS, Report No. 2007-2, FEDERAL 
RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS COMMUNITY AFFAIRS REPORT: A COMPILATION OF STATE 
MORTGAGE BROKER LAWS AND REGULATIONS, 1996–2007 (2007), available at http://www. 
minneapolisfed.org/publications_papers/capapers/mortgagebrokerregs/mortgagebrokerreg 
ulations_report.pdf (summarizing the basic licensing and registration policies for the fifty 
states and the District of Columbia pertaining to mortgage brokering). 
120. Id. at 5, 16. 
 121. See, e.g., Edward Wong, Beijing Looks to Tighten Policy to Cool Economy, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 4, 2010, at B3. 
122. See Friederike Fleischer, ―To Choose a House Means to Choose a Lifestyle.‖ The 
Consumption of Housing and Class-Structuration in Urban China, 19 CITY & SOC‘Y 287, 
301 (2007); Chang, supra note 1; Chengri Ding & Gerrit Knaap, Urban Land Policy 
Reform in China, LAND LINES, Apr. 2003, at 2. 
 123. Gregory M. Stein, Private and Public Construction in Modern China, 12 SAN 
DIEGO INT‘L L.J. 5, 23 (2010). 
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the bustling housing market experienced ―a first-hand lesson in 
the laws of supply and demand, and prices for urban residential 
units have continued to rise rapidly.‖124 The demand for housing 
appears endless, and raises the question: how much would the 
average citizen be willing to pay? 
Despite fierce oversight, China nevertheless fell prey to the 
starving demand for housing at any cost and surpassed its self-
imposed limitations on lending to individuals seeking personal 
residential mortgage loans.125 ―Shanghai‘s new personal housing 
mortgage loans hit 33.81 billion yuan in the first quarter, up 
31.13 billion yuan year-on-year, according to the Shanghai head-
quarter of the People‘s Bank of China. . . . That is [eleven] times 
more than in the first quarter of 2009.‖126 China has nonetheless 
displayed restraint and prudence to its benefit, rather than ac-
quiescing to populist sentiment. 
The state imposes higher interest rates on residential mortgage 
loans whenever the housing market spikes. ―Interest rates gener-
ally have climbed during the past several years, from 4.12% (with 
government workers entitled to a reduced rate of 3.58%) to 5.27%, 
then to 5.51%, and then to 6.12%, before settling at the 2007 rate 
of 6.93%.‖127 Such a measure likely deters the middle class demo-
graphic and some wealthier investors from seeking the loan. This 
makes sense because housing prices will rise, banks will seek to 
adjust the interest rate on the mortgage or convince a subprime 
borrower to leverage the equity on the property and take out a 
second mortgage, and the nearly impoverished borrower will in-
evitably default. China‘s exclusionary policy wisely maintains the 
integrity of the mortgage process as an exclusive offering made 
only to those with sufficient liquidity. 
The four major mortgage providers, furthermore, also pursue 
initiatives to dissuade the low income, or subprime, borrowers 
from requesting loans. The four banks are state owned,128 and 
when the government anticipates a rush on the housing market, 
124. Id. 
 125. See Chinese Banks Lent 1.2t Yuan in Jan: Report, CHINA BUS. NEWS (Jan. 26, 
2011), http://cnbusinessnews.com/chinese-banks-lent-1-2t-yuan-in-jan-report/. 
126. Hu Yang, Shanghai Personal Mortgage Loans Way Up, CHINA DAILY (Apr. 14, 
2010, 5:39 PM), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2010-04/14/content_9730403.htm. 
127. Stein, supra note 13, at 1340 n.62. 
128. Deng & Liu, supra note 91, at 217. 
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the banks increase the minimum down payment from 20 percent 
to 30 percent, with some banks charging even more.129 These pro-
visions would effectively diminish the number of low-income and 
middle-class earners who seek mortgages, while strengthening 
the banking industry and the mortgage market because the ma-
jority of loans are made to wealthy investors. 
The Politburo, exclusive from its influence with the banking 
system, also promulgates its own initiatives when the housing 
market grows too popular. It most recently restricted urban fami-
lies by limiting a family living in the city to purchase only one 
residential property per household.130 ―These are the first regula-
tions to be adopted restricting a [Chinese] national‘s ability to 
own residential property since China . . . return[ed] to private 
home ownership more than 10 years ago.‖131 The government has 
also imposed several new taxes and raised rates on some existing 
taxes that affect the real estate market.132 For example, investors 
incur a 
new 1.5% transfer tax. Additional taxes apply to larger apartments, 
which are defined as those that exceed a baseline of 120 square me-
ters (about 1,270 square feet) by more than 20%. In addition, the 
government implemented a new 5.5% tax on gains if an owner sells 
property within one year of purchasing it.133 
These recent changes demonstrate the government‘s inclination 
to restrain the market. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Chinese government weathered one of the darkest storms 
in financial history, growing nearly 9 percent in the process.134 
The international community offers various reasons for China‘s 
growth, many involving unethical or illegal practices violating 
human rights,135 intellectual property rules,136 and currency de-
129. See Stein, supra note 13, at 1336–37. 
 130. Paul McKenzie et al., Measures to Cool Chinese Property Market Target Both For-
eign and Local Purchasers, MORRISONFOERSTER CLIENT ALERT (Jan. 6, 2011), http://www. 
mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/110105-New-Measures-Cool-Chinese-Property.pdf. 
131. Id. 
132. Stein, supra note 13, at 1340. 
133. Id. at n.63. 
134. China‟s GDP grows 8.7% in 2009, supra note 5. 
135. See generally Committee Report, supra note 8 (discussing concerns with China‘s 
potential human rights violations and recommending solutions). 
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valuation.137 The United States and other members of the World 
Trade Organization should continue to encourage China to fulfill 
its treaty obligations and respect customary international law. It 
would be imprudent, however, to disregard the success China has 
enjoyed as a result of its real estate investment policy simply be-
cause China competes against the United States for global hege-
mony. The Chinese culture‘s propensity for cautious optimism 
and attempted reform has proved, if nothing else, economically 
successful in staggering proportions. 
China navigated the crisis by acknowledging the need for for-
ward-thinking labor law to increase the individual wealth of its 
populace, provide employees stability in the workplace, and en-
hance the level of confidence among a burgeoning middle class to 
pursue home ownership and newly emerging investment oppor-
tunities. The test of time will determine whether localities disre-
gard the federal government‘s decree, or whether workers have a 
genuinely effective bill working for them. 
Simplistic real estate investment and mortgage regulations 
continue to temper a vibrant middle class in its materialist 
quests. Requiring low-income earners to provide capital up front 
before receiving loans insures against default and drastically re-
duces the number of defaulters. The Chinese banking system 
primarily relies on the wealthy citizenry to profit from the stan-
dard adjustable-rate mortgage, particularly in instances of delin-
quency. Shielding lower income earners from default and benefit-
ting from property investment and consequent residential 
mortgage loans permits banks to extend such loans to the rising 
middle class. 
The mortgage industry likely will refine its policies toward 
middle class borrowers throughout the next five years to more ac-
curately reflect its level of default compared to timely repay-
ments. The government‘s adaptation to this new demographic 
makes the mortgage industry more vulnerable to exploitation. 
The banks‘ ability to mitigate overzealous property and housing 
 136. See generally Tania Branigan, Good for the Goose, Good for Propaganda: China 
Steals Top Gun Clip, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Jan. 28, 2011, at 26, available at http://www.guard 
ian.co.uk/world/2011/jan/28/china-tv-news-top-gun (discussing the potential use of a movie 
clip in place of actual video by the Chinese air force). 
137. See, e.g., Calmes, supra note 6. 
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Investment, however, protects the integrity of the mortgage sys-
tem from potential mass default and excessive loans. 
China‘s increasing reliance on exports and decrease in domestic 
consumption over the previous several years should alarm offi-
cials in Beijing. The Politburo should continue to cultivate its 
middle class through consistent wage increases, enforcement of 
employment provisions, maintenance of its mortgage market, and 
tentative, gradual forays into individual investment markets 
overseas. Perhaps the capitalist investor should pay homage to 
Chinese wisdom: seek examples of temperance from China‘s 
mortgage policies when entering unstable markets. 
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